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SUMMER 1960]
COMMENTS
COPYRIGHTS-THE PROTECTION OF ADVERTISING.'
In the dynamic mechanism that is the American economy, advertising
plays an immense and vital role. Indeed, in the year 1955, some nine
billion dollars2 was spent by the purveyors of consumer goods to stimulate
the buying American public. Among scholars there is a great deal of con-
flict as to the real economic value of advertising, but there can be little
doubt that large scale promotional efforts will continue, regardless of
the basic economic utility, and will exercise an evergrowing influence on
the purchasing habits of the American consumer. 4
As one would expect in an area which is continually developing in
import and significance, there is a considerable body of legal writing on
1. This comment has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competi-
tion on phases of copyright law.
2. Printer's Ink, February 10, 1956, p. 2.3.
3. See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1183 (1948), wherein the author suggests that the
primary functions of advertising are to inform the public as to the nature of available
goods and services, and secondly, to persuade them to purchase the given products
as advertised. Later the author states: "if we consider first the total stream of
production and consumption, persuasive advertising seems only to consume resources
that might be put to better use producing more goods and services. It does not
increase total demand, it only increases wants. . . . Effective demand comes not
from what we would like to have, but from the purchasing power of the community
created by its productive power. . . . We consume what we produce, and no more.
Considering the economic welfare of the community as a whole, to use up part of
the national product persuading people to buy product A rather than product B
appears to be a waste of resources." Hotchkiss, An Economic Defense of Adver-
tising, 15 AM. EcoN. REv. 14, 18 (Supp. 1925). In this article the writer argues
that the chief function of advertising is to educate, and that the dissemination of
information about goods and services is in itself an economic utility. The theory
being that an informed buyer is an efficient buyer. For a more recent and impartial
appraisal of the economic utility of advertising see BACH, EcONOMIcs: AN INTRO-
DUCTION To ANALYSIS AND POLICY 363 (1954). This author notes that, "For our
advertising dollar (paid in the price of the product) we get Bob Hope, billboards,
singing commercials, the funny papers, the New York Philharmonic. . . . Adver-
tising expenditures make possible a 5 cent daily newspaper and a 15 cent Saturday
Evening Post. . . ." He further states that whether or not this is the most efficient
utilization of our resources is in dispute, but at least there are provided some
services and the satisfaction of some wants.
4. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172 (3d ed. 1960), "... the day
has clearly gone forever of societies small enough for their members to have
personal acquaintance with each other and to find their station through the ap-
praisal of those who have any first hand knowledge of them. Publicity is an evil
substitute, and the art of publicity is a black art; but it has come to stay and
every year adds to its potency and to the finality of its judgments. The hand that
rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine rules the country;
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the topic of advertising. However, this reservoir of material deals pri-
marily with the law regulating advertising which is fraudulent or otherwise
contrary to public policy. 5 Articles concerned with the legal remedies
available to the advertiser 6 to protect him from imitation or plagiarism of
his advertisements are scarce and incomplete. 7 It will, therefore, be the
purpose of this comment to examine the avenues of legal protection which
are available to the advertiser, with a particular emphasis on the manner
in which the application of the copyright laws afford unique and advan-
tageous protection.
I.
THE DOCTRINE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE
PROTECTION OF ADVERTISING
A.
Basic Elements of Unfair Competition.
With the development of advertising into an economic factor of
substantial importance, the courts were faced with the problem of pro-
tecting the interests of the advertiser from imitation or plagiarism, which
in modern times is extensive. 8 Absent statutory protection the unwary
advertiser was left to the common law relief available under the doctrine
of unfair competition.
The doctrine of unfair competition arose at common law as a method
of protecting trademarks,9 but the remedy it provides has been extended
to afford protection in all cases where it appears that one has by fraud or
deception, interfered with, or captured the business of a competitor.10
Generally relief is granted in unfair competition cases only if the claimant
can show that the public is being deceived into believing that defendants
goods are those of the claimant," although it has been held that it is not
5. Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1956). This note contains a complete dis-
cussion of the regulation of advertising and an extensive codification of all federal
and state statutory material in this area.
6. The term "advertiser" will be used in this comment to denote the owner
of the property rights and interest in a given advertisement which will be legally
recognized and accorded protection.
7. The principal articles in this area are: Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35
Ky. L.J. 205 (1947); Freedland, Copyright Protection of Advertising, 27 Ky.
L.J. 391 (1939); Savoid, The extent of Copyright Protection for Advertising, 16
NOTRE DAME LAW. 298 (1941).
8. Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 542 (1932).
9. See, NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 1 (4th ed. 1947).
10. Hesse v. Grossman, 152 Cal.App.2d 526, 313 P.2d 625 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957); American Shops v. American Fashion Shops, 13 N.J.Super. 416, 80 A.2d
575 (App. Div. 1951).
11. Landis Machinery Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1944),
wherein the court found no unfair competition as "there is no evidence that de-
fendant made any effort to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiff." Haeger
Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F.Supp. 261, 268 (S.D. Cal. 1954). The
court here followed and cited the test used by the California Courts, as follows:
"... the essence of unfair comnetition lies in the simulation and imitation of goods
2
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necessary to show actual deception, it being sufficient to establish that
such deception will be the natural and probable consequence of defendant's
acts." - However, actual or probable deception must be proved, and the
test which has been adopted to measure this deception is whether the acts
of the defendant are such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary pur-
chaser, buying with such care as would usually be exercised in like trans-
actions.' 3
In addition to proving a deception of the public to the detriment of
the plaintiff, some jurisdictions have held that there must be a specific
intent to deceive the buyer or the public. 14  Other jurisdictions have
abandoned the requirement of intent and hold that it is sufficient to show
injury to the plaintiff in conjunction with conduct that does in fact or
tends to deceive the public. 15
There is a further conflict existing as to the requirement of competi-
tion which must exist between the litigants. In some states before an
action for unfair competition can be successfully pursued there must be a
showing that the goods, services or business of the plaintiff and defendant
were in actual competition, 6 that is, that the litigants deal in goods or
services of the same kind and solicit the same customers simultaneously.
There has been a more recent development which recognizes the value
of the good will of the merchant or businessman and allows an action for
unfair competition absent a showing of direct competition between the
parties.' 7 Of course, it is axiomatic that a stronger case will exist where
the litigants are in direct competition for the same customers, for it is
precisely in such cases that the basic requirement of confusion and de-
ception of the purchaser will most readily be met.' 8
of a rival or competitor with the purpose of deceiving the unwary public into
buying the imitation under the impression that it is purchasing the goods of such
competitor." For earlier cases on this point see Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,
26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) ; Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333 (3d
Cir. 1925).
12. Safeway Stores v. Rudner, 246 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Ford Motor
Co. v. Alltite Motor Products Co., 117 F.Supp. 460, 584 (N.D. Fla. 1954) ; Squeezit
Corp. v. Plastic Dispensers, 31 N.J.Super. 217, 106 A.2d 322 (App. Div. 1954).
13. American Photographic Publishing Co. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 135
F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1943); American Luggage Works v. United States Trucking
Co., 158 F.Supp. 50 (D.C. Mass. 1957).
14. Rathbone Sord & Co. v. Champion Still Range Co., 189 Fed. 26 (6th Cir.
1911) ; Lamont Corliss & Co. v. Hershey, 140 Fed. 765 (M.D. Pa. 1905).
15. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947), held that the
absence of fraudulent intent did not defeat a finding of unfair competition. Lane
Bryant v. Maternity Lane, Ltd. of California, 173 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Nall
v. Pennex Products Co., 4 F.R.D. 235 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
16. Atlas Manufacturing Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398 (8th Cir. 1913)
Layton Pure Food v. Church & Dwight, 182 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1910) ; Yellow Cab
Co. v. Sachs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 Pac. 33 (1923).
17. Aunt Jamima Mills Co. v. Rigney Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918) ; Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc.,
317 Il. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943).
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B.
The Doctrine of Unfair Competition as Applied to Advertising.
The basic requirements for the existence of a cause of action for
unfair competition apply with equal force to the use of advertising as a
method of effecting such unfair competition. In the case of Heuer v.
Parkhill,19 the court, while finding unfair competition where a hotel opera-
tor simulated his competitor's advertising folder in an attempt to induce
the public to support his hotel in preference to plaintiff's, summarized the
law relating to the copying of advertising materials and unfair competi-
tion as follows:
"The general rule is that the appropriation of another's advertising
matter or method is not of itself unfair competition, although it may
become such where it induces or may induce the public to suppose
that in dealing with the appropriator they are dealing with or ob-
taining the product or services of the originator.' 02
In an earlier case2 ' in which plaintiff alleged unfair competition because
inter alia defendant in the advertising of his products in newspapers and
magazines had imitated advertisements published by the plaintiff, the
court stated:
"We have carefully studied all of the exhibits in evidence and
are convinced that no reasonable person previously acquainted with
plaintiff's advertisements would be misled by anything appearing in
the advertisements of defendant company. Unfair competition begins
where imitation results in deception of the customers of the party
complaining" 22
The court here refused to find unfair competition, even admitting imita-
tion, and held that the presence of distinctive trade names on the articles
appearing in the advertisement was sufficient to prevent public deception.
The United States Supreme Court in announcing its decision in the
case of International News Service v. Associated Press2 3 seemed to give
credit to the theory that imitation itself should be enjoined in an action
for unfair competition. In this case plaintiff news service charged de-
fendant news service with appropriation and subsequent republication of
its news dispatches. The Court here reasoned that misappropriation can
be condemned under the notion of unfair competition as readily as mis-
representation. 24 However, the broad doctrine announced has not been
19. 114 F.Supp. 665 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
20. Id. at 670.
21. International Heating Co. v. Oliver Oil Gas Burner & Machine Co., 288
Fed. 708 (8th Cir. 1923).
22. Id. at 711.
23. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
24. Id. at 242.
[VOL. 5
4
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followed. 25 Perhaps, as suggested by one writer,26 the International News
case will be limited to its facts, because in that case the defendant made use
of the vendable commodity itself, the news, as well as imitating plaintiff's
literary ability.
Thus, it appears that an advertising idea, scheme, or method, may be
effectively used with impunity by an imitator and unless the advertiser
can sustain the burden of proving actual or probable deception of the
buying public he will have no protection under the doctrine of unfair
competition. In jurisdictions which require the showing of fraudulent
intent27 and/or direct competition, 28 a fortiori, protection will be more
elusive.
In addition, with an action for unfair competition, which sounds in
tort, the advertiser must seek his relief in the state in which the cause of
action arose,29 thus introducing the element of uncertainty into any pros-
pective protection. With the basic elements of the tort, deception, intent,
and the requirement of competition varying among the jurisdictions,
whether an advertiser will be protected from imitation will depend largely
upon chance in a given case.
C.
Remedies Available Under The Doctrine of Unfair Competition.
The advertiser who is successful in proving unfair competition has a
wide range of remedies available. In an action at law, the plaintiff can
recover for any loss he has suffered because of defendant's acts30 and in
addition he may recover punitive damages at the discretion of the court.3 '
In equity, the plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief 32 or he may seek an
accounting of defendant's profits33 even in the absence of proof of any
loss, 34 as the theory of an accounting is not based on the plaintiff's loss
but rather on defendant's wrongful using of another's property.
However, it would seem that the remedy of accounting is of doubtful
value in advertising cases, as generally it would be most difficult with
current marketing and promotional schemes to estimate what part of any
25. Associated Press v. Kvos, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935). In this case
plaintiff's action was dismissed because the parties were not in direct competition;
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), Learned Hand, J.,
refused to apply the International News test.
26. Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1932).
27. NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS, § 351 (4th ed. 1947).
28. NIMs, op. cit. su pra note 27 § 9.
29. Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert, denied,
352 U.S. 871 (1957).
30. NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 423 (4th ed. 1947).
31. Truzzolino Food Products Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 108 Mont. 408,
91 P.2d 415 (1939).
32. Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Sunbeam
Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1951).
33. NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 424 (4th ed. 1947).
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new business has resulted from the use of plagiarized advertising, and
further if there is a pattern of widespread advertising by defendant, only
a part of which he has plagiarized, the problem of rationally estimating
the profits realized by defendant's wrongful acts will be compounded.
In this area the courts have uniformly held that where it appears that there
is no rational rule by which the profits can be estimated, an accounting
will be denied.3 5 In addition to an accounting, equity may also order
damages for any loss suffered by the plaintiffs.36
It would seem, therefore, that the uncertainty of relief for unfair
competition is offset somewhat by the extended structure of remedies and
damages available to the advertiser if he is able to sustain his claim of
imitation or plagiarism.
II.
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAWS OF COPYRIGHT.
The framers of the United States Constitution granted to the Con-
gress of the United States the power "to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries."37
Pursuant to this grant of power Congress has passed a number of
copyright laws, 38 the latest of which grants to the author a private monopoly
for a limited duration,39 and the exclusive right to print, reprint, publish,
copy, vend, and perform the copyrighted work for profit.4 0 The purpose
in granting such protection is to stimulate work and development in the
arts and sciences and thus assure that the intellectual and aesthetic product
of such authors will be made available for the edification of the public.
One will look in vain to find the word advertising included in the
subject matter covered by the Copyright Act. Section 541 of the statute
requires the author to specify to which class of subject matter his copy-
right belongs, and then lists some thirteen categories, none of which ex-
pressly refers to advertising. However, Section 5 concludes as follows:
"the above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of
copyrights. '42 Thus it has been through the development of case law
that advertising matter has been brought under the protection of the Copy-
right Laws.
35. Ste. Pierre Smirnoff, Inc. v. Hirsch, 109 F.Supp. 10 (S.D. Cal. 1952)
Forstmann Wollen Co. v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 89 F.Supp. 964 (E.D. N.Y. 1950) ; Stern
Apparel Corp. v. Raingard, Inc., 87 F.Supp. 621 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
36. NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 424 (4th ed. 1947).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
38. 1 STAT. 124 (1790); 2 STAT. 171 (1802); 3 STAT. 481 (1819); 4 STAT.
436 (1831); 4 STAT. 728 (1834); 11 STAT. 138 (1856); 12 STAT. 130 (1861); 13
STAT. 540 (1865) ; 14 STAT. 395 (1867) ; 16 STAT. 198 (1870) ; 35 STAT. 1075 (1909).
39. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1952).
40. 63 STAT. 154 (1949), 17 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1952).








Advertising as a Proper Subject of a Copyright.
The early American decisions took the position that advertisements
were not entitled to copyright protection because they did not possess the
requisite originality or artistic value demanded by the statute.
43
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,44 announced a new standard with respect
to the artistic value and degree of originality required to entitle illustrated
advertising to the protection of the copyright statutes. That case involved
a circus poster portraying performers connected with the circus. The plain-
tiffs, having complied with the statutory requirements to obtain a copy-
right, sued the defendant for infringement. The United States Supreme
Court, in granting the relief sought, specifically held that the material
contained in the advertisement was a proper subject for a copyright.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in announcing the opinion of the Court stated:
"Certainly works are not the less connected with fine arts be-
cause their pictorial quality attracts the crowd, and therefore gives
them a real use, - if use means to increase trade and to help to make
money. A picture is nonetheless a picture, and nonetheless a sub-
ject of copyright, that it is used for an advertisement. . . .It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. ' 45
The United States Supreme Court thus decided that advertisements
were a proper subject of copyright, and subsequent decisions 6 fully ac-
cepted the doctrine of the Bleistein case, 47 that the only critical test was the
ultimate artistic merit of the advertisement in question, thereby in effect
43. Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891). In this case Mr. Justice
Field, in holding that a description label on a bottle was not subject to copyright,
stated: "To be entitled to a copyright the article must have by itself some value as
a composition, at least to the extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere
advertisement or description of the subject to which it is attached." Accord, J. L.
Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 Fed. 316 (7th Cir. 1897) ; Ehret v. Price, 10 Fed. 553
(D.C. N.Y. 1880). Contra, Mutual Advertising Co. v. Refo, 76 Fed. 961 (D.S.C.
1896); Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 Fed. 466 (S.D. N.Y. 1889).
44. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
45. Id. at 251. See Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100
(1919), in which the United States Supreme Court, although not specifically passing
upon the question, assumed the validity of a copyright of an advertisement con-
taining pictorial illustrations of styles in women's apparel, thus in effect adhering
to the standard established in the Bleistein case.
46. Campbell v. Wireback, 269 Fed. 372 (4th Cir. 1920), allowed a copyright
of catalog cuts of orthopedic devices; Stecher Lithographic Co. v. Dunston Litho-
graphic Co., 233 Fed. 601 (W.D. N.Y. 1916), allowed a copyright on Lithographs of
vegetable products; J. H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957 (S.D. N.Y.
1915), allowed a copyright for catalog designs of brassware fixtures; DaPrato
Statuary Co. v. Guiliani Statuary Co., 189 Fed. 90 (C.C.D. Minn. 1911) ; National
Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufmann, 189 Fed. 215 (N.D. Pa. 1911).
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equating the presence of any artistic value with the constitutional require-
ment that the work promote the "useful arts. ' 48
It was not until the case of Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co.,49
that the courts completely developed the scope of protection now available
to the advertiser. The earlier cases had faithfully followed the rule set down
in Bleistein,50 that advertisements, if they possessed "some" artistic merit,
were proper subjects of copyright. But the court in the Ansehl case, 51 in
granting relief to the plaintiff for an infringement of a newspaper adver-
tisement of his cosmetic and toilet articles, did not merely recognize the
author's property rights in an advertisement as rights in a product that
had artistic value per se, but recognized and protected property rights
in the nature of the words used and in the arrangement of the materials. 52
The language of the court was as follows:
"The defendants might appropriate the ideas and express them
in their own pictures and in their own language, but they could not
appropriate the plaintiff's advertisement by copying his arrangement of
materials, his ilustrations and language, and thereby create substan-
tially the same composition in substantially the same manner without
subjecting themselves to liability for infringement." 53
Since the Ansehl case, 54 a particular arrangement of a subject and its
materials that is original in the sense that it has not been copied from
another work of the same character,55 and which contains "any" literary or
artistic merit, would seem to be the proper subject of a copyright.5 6
Indeed, at least one court5 7 has taken cognizance of the real test that
the courts are in fact using, although often disguised in such terms as
originality and aesthetic value, when in allowing an infringement action
for a simple advertisement the judge candidly noted that the arrange-
48. Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 Fed. 823 (8th Cir.1924) ; No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Norris, 277 Fed. 951 (4th Cir. 1921), affirming
271 Fed. 536 (D.C. Md. 1921); Golden Rule, Inc. v. B.V.D. Co. 242 Fed. 929 (8th
Cir. 1917).
49. 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
50. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
51. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
52. It has been suggested that the application of this doctrine creates a difficult
problem of distinguishing between imitation of arrangement which may constituteinfringement and imitation of general method which would seem permissible. See
Note, 46 HAiiv. L. Rev. 332 (1933).53. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131, 138 (8th Cir. 1932).
54. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., supra note 53.
55. COPINcniz, LAW or COPYRIGHT 75 (6th ed. 1927).
56. On the proposition that it requires at least a low degree of originality and
artistic or literary value to allow the copyright of an advertisement see Comptone
Co., Ltd. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1958) wherein posters advertising
sunglasses were held subject to copyright protection; Silvers v. Russell, 113 F.Supp.
119 (S.D. Cal. 1953) in which a label of a dancing girl on a phonograph record
was held copyrightable for advertisement purposes; Gordon v. Weir, 111 F.Supp.
117 (E.D. Mich. 1953), where an original advertisement of a dot-counting contest
was held to be copyrightable.
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ment of the illustration and text possessed the power to "catch and hold
a readers eye." It is submitted that this, after all, is a proper function of
advertising to "catch and hold the readers eye," and that it does not appear
that the Supreme Court in announcing its decision in the Bleistein case, 58
in response to commercial reality, had any other test in mind.
It has been suggested by one writer59 that the use of advertising on
radio is analogous to the use of dramatic materials and its use may not
be a publication under the requirement of the copyright laws.60 Pre-
sumably the author would make the same argument in relation to television
commercials.
There has been no direct holding on this narrow point, although the
court in the case of Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 1 held that
the radio production of original scripts for advertising did not constitute
such publication as to divest the author of his common law copyright. 6 2
However, it should be noted that in this case the popular comedian Ed
Wynn was commissioned to write and to perform the scripts not solely
as advertisements, but rather as an embodiment of an entire entertain-
ment segment of the program in which the advertising was incidentally in-
terspersed throughout the scripts.
It would seem clear that the use of spot commercials on radio and
television can clearly be distinguished from the holding in this case; and
although such commercials often do contain an element of humor and
entertainment, they are primarily informative and persuasive, and their
function, as in the case of printed materials, is clearly to catch and hold
the mind's eye of the public.
Indeed, materials broadcast on the radio have been allowed the pro-
tective mantle of the copyright laws, 3 and in the area most analogous to
television commercials, statutory copyrighting of motion pictures has long
been allowed.6 4 The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v.
Bijou Theatre Co.,05 in declaring that motion pictures came within the
copyright statute, stated that ". . . Motion Picture Photoplay Films are
either dramatic works entitled to protection under subdivision (d) . . .or
they are non dramatic works entitled to protection under subdivision
(b). '"66 The right to copyright protection has also been construed to
58. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
59. Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35 Ky. L.J. 205 (1947).
60. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
61. 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
62. At common law the author of an original product of intellectual labor who
reduces the same to a tangible form has a protected copyright in the work until
such time as he makes a general publication thereof, and then he is held to have
dedicated his work to the public and he loses all his protection. Warner Bros. Pictures
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. 102 F.Supp. 141 (D.C. Cal. 1951); Krait v. Cohen,
32 F.Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 117 F.2d 579 (1941).
63. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F.2d
411 (6th Cir. 1925), cert denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925).
64. Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), Cert.
dcnied. 303 U.S. 655 (1938).
65. 3 F.Supp. 66 (D.C. Mass. 1933).
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cover motion picture shorts consisting of comedy material with little or
no plot; the court considering that the reduction of such material to
motion pictures was a dramatization within the meaning of the statute.67
It should be noted that the infringements found in the radio and movie
cases were of the authors' exclusive right to perform publicly for profit. 68
It appears, therefore, that arguing from the holdings in the radio
and movie cases, it could be found that advertising materials which are
broadcast on radio and television would be the proper subject of copy-
right protection of they were imitated or broadcast without authority by
another publicly and for profit. Whether the expectation of sales and the
development of good will anticipated by the subsequent unauthorized
advertiser would constitute the requisite profit is a problem that the courts
must decide; however, it would appear that by any sophisticated view of
commercial realities such expectation would constitute profit.
In addition it is clear that the tendency of the modern cases is to
increase rather than restrict the subject matter of copyright, 69 and in line
with this tendency and the doctrine dictated in Bleistein70 and later cases,
it seems that the preferable view would be to allow copyright of adver-
tising materials that are broadcast over radio and television.
It is now apparent that advertising if properly brought within the
requirements of the copyright law as to notice7' and registration, 2 will
be granted the protection from imitation available under the federal
statute.
B.
Procurement of a copyright.
The basic elements necessary to procure copyright protection under the
present statute are a publishing of the work with a notice of copyright 73
and registration. The registration requirement under the law 74 is not a
sine qua non to the existence of a valid copyright, however, 75 but merely
exists as a condition precedent to the bringing of a cause of action for
infringement.76
67. Vitophone Corp. v. Hutchison Amusement Co., 19 F.Supp. 359 (D.C. Mass.
1937) remanded on other grounds, 93 F.2d 176 (1937).
68. For a complete discussion of the problems involved in this area see Burbank,
Television-A Performance for Profitf, 5 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 133 (1953).
69. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
70. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
71. 68 STAT. 1032 (1954), 17 U.S.C. § 19 (Supp. 1952).
72. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-28 (1952).
73. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952) ; Davenport Quigley Expedition,
Inc. v. Century Productions, Inc., 18 F.Supp. 974 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
74. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
75. Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
76. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1952); Dan Kastoff, Inc. v. Palmer
Jewelry Mfg. Co., 171 F.Supp. 602 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
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Publication is generally held to occur at the earliest date of unre-
stricted sale or distribution of copies of the first authorized edition by the
owner of the copyright.77
Probably the most important single requirement for obtaining a copy-
right is notice, and rigid compliance as to form and location of the copy-
right notice is essential since a publication without the requisite notice
constitutes a dedication to the public, and a loss of all copyright protection
either at common law or under the statutes. 78
Section 1479 of the federal statute provides that on failure to deposit
the required copies of the subject of the copyright the Registrar of Copy-
rights may at any time subsequent to publication require that the owner
of the copyright deposit the required copies, and in default of such demand
there may be a $100 fine and the copyright shall become void. However,
this section appears to be seldom invoked, and the dictum of at least two
cases suggests that even in the case of default under Section 1480 there would
be no automatic forfeiture of rights without the bringing of an action
by the registrar to have the copyright declared void. 81
C.
Infringement of the Copyright.
The copyright law does not protect ideas per se,82 but only the
particular expression of such ideas, 83 and if the same idea can be expressed
in a number of different ways, a plurality of copyrights may result and
no infringement will have taken place. 84 It has been held that a copying
need not be of every detail as long as it is substantially similar to the copy-
righted work8 5 and, further that paraphrasing or copying may be an in-
fringement even though there be little or no obvious identity between the
two subjects.8" As mentioned previously87 the imitation of the arrange-
ment of material may be sufficient to constitute an infringement in the
area of advertising. 88
77. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE-
MIARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 119 (1957), published by American Law Institute. This
is an excellent treatment of the basic requirements for procuring a copyright.
78. Metro Associated Services v. Webster City Graphic, 117 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.
Iowa 1953). See SEIDEL, op. cit. supra note 98, at 123-126, on the forms and loca-
tion of notice.
79. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
80. Ibid.
81. Lumierie v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 275 Fed. 428 (2d Cir. 1921) ; Mittenthal
v. Berlin, 291 Fed. 714 (S.D. N.Y. 1923).
82. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
83. Funkhouser v. Loe's, 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1954).
84. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926); Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d
468 (S.D. N.Y. 1930).
85. Comptone Co., Ltd. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1958).
86. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); West Publishing Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833 (E.D. N.Y. 1909).
87. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
88. For cases holding that there was infringement of an advertisement see
notes 45, 56 supra. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 56
F.Supp. 600 (D.C. Minn. 1944) ; Brundy Engineering Co. v. Penn Union Electric
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As concerns copyrights generally the courts, in holding that there
must be a substantial taking, have decided that any unreasonable taking
would qualify as such,89 and have been concerned with the degree of taking.
This is a result of the awareness of the courts of the doctrine of fair use,90
which has been developed generally in reference to the use of scientific and
scholarly works."' Indeed, one of the primary purposes of our copyright
laws is to encourage the promulgation of new ideas, and the doctrine of
fair use allows the public, within certain limits,9 2 to make effective use of
written materials without the express consent of the author. However, it
should be recognized that the doctrine of fair use has very little if any
applicability to advertising.
Advertising is a latter-day variation in the general law of copyright,
and it has been afforded the protection of the federal statute not because
its publication adds to the general store of scientific or other useful knowl-
edge,9 3 but rather, it has been protected in response to commercial reali-
ties9 4 which recognize that advertising serves a very real function in our
economy, and that property rights in such advertising should be granted
more extensive coverage and protection than was available under the
doctrine of unfair competition.
It would seem, therefore, that what is substantial copying in the case
of advertising should not be determined by any test of reasonableness,
but rather, the courts should, on a side by side comparison, judge whether
or not the copying has amounted to the appropriation of another's work,
which has resulted in the diminution of the commercial value of the copy-
righted material.9 5 Under this test "any" copying by a competitor would
89. Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Roe-Lawton v. Hal E.
Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
90. Fair use has been defined as a privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his con-
sent, nothwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright. BALL,
THE LAW OF COPYRIGIIT & LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). Toksvig v. Bruce
Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
91. Thompson v. Grensback, 94 F.Supp. 453 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). See Cohn,
Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPosIUM 43, 50 (1954), in
which the writer suggests that the policies behind the doctrine of fair use do notjustify the application of that doctrine to cases where the work is not of a scho!arly
or literary nature.
92. The limits depend upon the facts of each case. The general rule is that
a reasonable use is a fair use. The court in the case of Karll v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 39 F.Supp. 836 (D.C. Wis. 1941), declared that in determining whether there
has been a fair use the court will look to the nature, quantity and value of the
material used, and to the degree to which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish
the profits of the original.
93. One of the functions of advertising is, of course, to disseminate information
and add nothing more than a mere knowledge of the existence and nature of an
isolated product. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
94. Justice Holmes in the case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239, 251 (1903), declared, "Yet if they [the illustrated advertisements] com-
mand the interest of any public, they have a commercial value, - and the taste of
any public is not to be treated with contempt. It is the ultimate fact of the moment,
whatever may he our hopes for a change."
95. West Publishing Co. v. Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833 (E.D. N.Y. 1909).
See comment, 31 Tur.. L. REv. 528 (1957) where the author points out that this
test is very closely related to the principles of unfair competition. In International
[VOL. 5
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be sufficient to constitute an infringement, and if a side by side comparison
reveals a substantial borrowing as concerns the language, subject matter,
and arrangement then the courts should find such infringement. 96 It
should be apparent that such comparisons are relatively simple in the case
of most advertisements which in appealing to the general public are seldom
of any great length or involvement.
If in fact there has been an infringement, it is immaterial that the
defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiff's copyright, 97 as it is the
result, not the intention that ultimately determines infringement.98 How-
ever, the presence of intention to infringe has been considered, and if
found to exist the degree of taking necessary to constitute infringement
lessened. 99
D.
Remedies and Damages Available Under the
Copyright Laws.
If the advertiser can establish infringement, he has recourse to a
multiplicity of remedies. Section 101,100 of the copyright statute provides,
cumulatively, not alternatively, for any or all of the following:
(a) an injunction restraining the infringement.
(b) damages and an accounting for profits.
(c) impounding during the pendancy of the action all articles
alleged to infringe a copyright.
(d) destruction of the infringing copies and plates.
The statute 1° ' provides for specific maximum and minimum amounts to
be awarded in lieu of proof of actual damages and profits, and the courts
have a wide degree of discretion in determining damages within the
'prescribed statutory limitations.10 2 This remedy of awarding statutory
Heating Co. v. Oliver Oil Gas Burner & Machine Co., 288 Fed. 708 (8th Cir. 1923),
the court in 4;c: stated a test for infringement of an advertisement as follows:
"If the advertisements of the defendant company were so similar in appearance and
wording to the plaintiff's that the ordinary person reading those of the defendant
would be deceived and believe he was reading those of the plaintiff. It should
be noted that this case involved an action for unfair competition.
96. See the extensive side by side comparison developed in the case of Ansehl
v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
97. Metro Associated Services v. Webster City Graphic, 117 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.
Iowa 1952).
98. Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Henkley, 101 F.Supp. 801 (D.C. Mo. 1951),
off'd, 199 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953); Witmark
& Sons v. Galloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
99. Meccano v. Wagner, 234 Fed. 912 (S.D. Ohio 1916), vzodified on other
gro;m.s, 246 Fed. 603 (5th Cir. 1918).
100. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 62 STAT. 992 (1948), 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
101. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 101-b (1952).
102. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 288 (1952), Clarifi-
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damages was adopted to insure that the owner of the infringed copy-
right would receive some recompense in cases where the rules of law
render proof of actual damages and discovery of profits difficult or im-
possible. 10 3
As was suggested earlier, 04 the proof of damages for loss of profit in
the area of advertising will in most cases be impossible, and the statu-
tory remedy' 05 will have to be applied. The advertiser under section
101 (b) does have a distinct advantage as to the burden of proof. The
statute provides that the plaintiff is not required to prove the amount of
profits, it being sufficient to prove the amount of sales, thus placing the
burden upon the defendant to prove any element of cost which he claims. 10 6
However, the plaintiff must show the causal connection between the in-
fringement and the resulting increase in sales of the defendant, and it is
this burden that is almost insurmountable in the case of advertising where
the amount of sales which can be attributed to any one advertisement is
at best speculative.
10 7
Section 116,108 provides that the successful plaintiff may recover
attorneys' fees and full costs, and large sums have been recovered through
a utilization of this section.10 9 However, in all cases, whether such costs
and fees will be allowed, and to what extent, is a matter of discretion with
the court." 0
The difficult problem of whether repeated printings of the imitated
material amounts to a single infringement, or to a plurality of violations
was discussed in Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Co."' In that case the
plaintiffs designed pictorial illustrations to be used in the advertisement
of different styles in women's apparel. All of the illustrations were sepa-
rately copyrighted under the requirements of the statute. The plaintiffs,
for a charge, granted exclusive licenses to use the illustration for limited
periods. The defendants without consent or authority from the plaintiff
reproduced and published in its newspapers six of plaintiff's copyrighted
illustrations. They were published separately, each in a different issue
of a newspaper. Five were published once and the other one twice. The
United States Supreme Court held that since the statute states that
103. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1944)
Brundy Engineering Co. v. Sheldon Service Corp., 127 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1942).
104. See text at note 35 supra.
105. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100 (1919) ; Markham
v. A.E. Gorden Co., 221 F.2d 587 (ist Cir. 1955) ; Advertisers Exchange v. Hinkley,
199 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1952).
106. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1954).
107. See text at note 35 supra.
108. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952).
109. Gunm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946), allowed$10,000 for attorney's fees; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 86 F.Supp. 399(E.D. N.Y. 1949), modified on other grounds, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1949), allowed
$7,500 as attorney's fees.
110. Advertisers Exchange v. Anderson, 144 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Brundy
Engineering Co. v. Sheldon Services Corp., 127 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1942).
111. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100 (1919).
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liability is imposed for infringing "the copyright of any copyrighted work,"
and further, because the words are in the singular, not the plural, "each
copyright is treated as a distinct entity and the infringement of it a
distinct wrong to be redressed through the enforcement of liability."' 1 2
The Court further held that since there were separate illustrations the
use of each one was a separate infringement, and that as concerns the item
used twice, since its use was by and for the benefit of different adver-
tisers, that each use was also a separate infringement.113 The Court did
not reach the question of whether repetition or continued use of one illus-
tration by the same advertiser would constitute one or more infringements.
Subsequent cases have considered this latter problem, and have gen-
erally concluded that such a use by a single advertiser would constitute
but one infringement," 4 although there is some authority to the contrary."'
In a separate series of cases, wherein there was an unauthorized use of
a copyrighted item, not continuously but on several distinct and disasso-
ciated occasions by the same advertiser, it was held that there existed a
separate infringement for each use." 6
Regardless of the problem involved in multiple-use and infringement
cases, only one suit to claim damages should be brought,' 7 and all claims
for infringement are subject to a three year statute of limitations." 8
It should be kept in mind that copyright protection will be denied to
any material which is obscene or fraudulent. Thus, in the case of Stone
v. Dugan Piano Co.," 9 the court held that advertisements which are mis-
leading or untrue are not copyrightable, and the use thereof is not an
infringement of a copyright. The language of the court was: "if their
tendency be misleading and deceptive they will find the doors of a court
of equity barred against their admission.' 1 20 In like manner the presence of
immoral language in the subject of a copyright has led to a denial of pro-
tection.121
These decisions are in accord with the general principals of equity, and
the doctrine of unclean hands, 22 and it seems clear that if the advertiser
desires to ensure protection for his material he should keep in mind the
requirements of equity in regard to fraud and immorality.
112. Id. at 105, 106.
113. The court, therefore, allowed the minimum of $250.00 for each infringement.
114. E.g., Doll v. Libin, 17 F.Supp. 546 (D.C. Mont. 1936).
115. Eliot v. Geare-Marston Inc., 30 F.Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Zuckerman
v. Dickson, 35 F.Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
116. Cary v. Physical Cultural Hotel, 14 F.Supp. 977 (D.C. N.Y. 1936), aff'd,
88 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1937); Lindsay & Brewster, Inc. v. Verstein, 21 F.Supp. 264
(D.C. Me. 1937).
117. Savoid, Copyright Protection for Advertising, 16 NOTRE DAm LAW, 312
(1940), the author here discusses at length the problem of multiple infringement.
118. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1952).
119. 220 Fed. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
120. Td. at 043.
121. Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 Fed. 74 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1898).
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III.
JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of cases arising under
the copyright laws,123 and where infringement is the issue original juris-
diction has been given to the district courts.124 Conversely, where the
advertiser is seeking protection in an action for unfair competition his
cause will be governed by state law, and will be subject to the Erie125
doctrine if he should seek a federal forum.
Although unfair competition can exist without the infringement of a
copyright, 126 and the mere act of copyright infringement does not of itself
constitute unfair- competition, 127 it will, nevertheless, often appear that
the wrongful acts of appropriation simultaneously give rise to a cause
of action for unfair competition and for copyright infringement. 128 The
advertiser may, of course, waive his remedies for infringement and seek
relief in the state courts for unfair competition. 12 9 However, it would
clearly be to his advantage to find a forum in which he could pursue both
avenues of recovery.
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Hum v. Oursler,'30
decided that the federal courts could be used to pursue both remedies to
a decision on the merits simultaneously. In that case, the plaintiff made a
claim of copyright infringement in the district court, and also sought relief
upon the ground that the same acts complained of in the infringement
action constituted unfair competition under state law. The Supreme Court
held that the district court acquired jurisdiction by virtue of the substan-
tial federal question raised under the copyright statute, and that even
though the federal claim was rejected on the merits, the court still had
jurisdiction to decide the question of unfair competition. Thus, from the
jurisdictional viewpoint the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was extended
to cases of copyright and unfair competition where the claims for relief
are based on the same wrongful acts of appropriation. The Supreme
Court, in effect, held in the Hurn case 131 that the claims of infringement and
unfair competition are not separate and distinct causes of action, but are
different grounds asserted in support of the same cause of action. The
123. 62 STAT. 93 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1952).
124. Ibid.
125. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
126. Norma Lites v. Lawn Spray, 22 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1955).
127. Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., 108 F.Supp. 695 (D.C. Mass. 1952),
reversed on other grounds, 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953).
128. Hurm v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
129. Swanson Mfg. Co. v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.
1945).
130. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
131. Ibid.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol5/iss4/4
SUMMER 1960]
Supreme Court has subsequently ratified the doctrine of that case,' 32 and
the 1948 revision of the judicial code provides that:
"the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition, when joined with the sub-
stantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, or trademark
laws,"133
thus enacting the rule into statutory form.
It would, therefore, seem clear that if the advertiser has afforded
himself the protection of the copyright laws, and if he can meet the test
established in Hum13 4 and subsequent cases' 35 that the proof in support
of the claim of infringement and of unfair competition must substantially
overlap and arise from the same general acts so as to constitute one
cause of action brought on two separate grounds, then he can pursue
recovery simultaneously for the infringement and the alleged unfair compe-
tition and have the merits of each issue decided in the federal forum.
IV.




As previously mentioned, 3 6 mere ideas are not copyrightable, and thus
the "idea man" or advertising agency is often faced with the problem of
determining how to protect an advertising plan or scheme while in the
process of marketing it. Of course, if the disclosure of the idea or plan
is made privately, and in pursuance of an express contract, or under terms
of trust, the disclosing party may claim legal relief for the violation of any
legally created rights.'
3 7
However, absent such legal arrangements, there seems to be a split
of authority as to whether the vendor of ideas can collect damages for the
use of these ideas on the theory of a contract either implied in law or in
fact.
132. In Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S.
315 (1938), the court held that once jurisdiction has been properly obtained of the
cause of action for the alleged infringement of a trademark, such jurisdiction persists
to deal with all grounds supporting it, including unfair competition with the marked
articles.
133. 62 STAT. 931 (1948) 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1952).
134. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
135. Scarves By Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfg., Inc., 173 F.Supp. 625
(S.D. N.Y. 1959); General Electric Co. v. Schwartz, 99 F.Supp. 369 (E.D. N.Y.
1951). For a case distinguishing this rule see Frazier Tandum Systems, Inc. v.
Hutchens & Sons Metal Products, Inc., 110 Supp. 261 (S.D. Mo. 1953).
136. See text at note 73 supra.
137. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1930); Larson v. General
Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 294 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) ; Cole v. Philip H. Lord, Inc., 28
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In all cases, even those of express contract, the idea, to be afforded
legal protection, must have been previously unknown to the using party.138
Further, the idea must be novel, in the sense that it has not been published
or placed in the public domain,' 39 and it must have been reduced to a con-
crete form.1
40
The requirement that the idea be in a concrete form if it is to be pro-
tected is universal and has been adopted for cogent reasons. It is seldom
possible to determine the exact nature of an intangible idea or to compare
it directly with other ideas, as the vehicle of language, especially when no
more than a momentary utterance, is capable of extreme distortion. It
is often difficult to attribute the originality to any one individual or to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence than one idea is so similar to
another as to constitute imitation thereof. Consequently, the evidentiary
and administrative problems of protecting property rights in ethereal ideas
have led the courts to establish the showing of concreteness as an essential
element of the cause of action for imitation or plagiarism of commercial
ideas.
However, there is some conflict of legal opinion as to what constitutes
concreteness. Some courts141 have held that a mere written sketch or
outline was sufficiently concrete for protection, while courts in other juris-
dictions have declared that the ideas to be protected must be in complete
and detailed form ready to be acted upon.
B.
Cases Denying Protection.
The older cases clearly held that except in the situation of an express
contract, if an idea were disclosed it became the property of all, 142 even if
the idea were in writing or otherwise concrete.'
43
In the case of Stone v. Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co.,'" the de-
fendant paid plaintiff $500.00 for the use of a script, which payment did not
include the rights to use of an advertising idea contained within it. The
court, in denying plaintiff relief in an action for damages for the un-
authorized use of such idea, held that the embodiment of the advertising
idea contained in the script was not reduced to a concrete form.
138. Masline v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639 (1921);
Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 195 N.Y.Supp. 574 (App. Div. 1922).
139. Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F.Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd 210
F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953); William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., 95 F.Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
140. Ibid.
141. Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. 85 Cal. App. 2d 198, 192 P.2d 493
(Dist. Ct. App. 1948). For cases requiring a detailed form see O'Brien v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F.Supp. 13 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Bowen v. Yankee Network,
Inc., 46 F.Supp. 62 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
142. Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Bristol v.
The Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892).
143. Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S.E. 177 (1917).
144. 23 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1940).
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The later case of Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 14 5 sheds
further light upon the nature of concreteness. Plaintiff, in an unsolicited
letter, sent to the defendant an advertising idea. The idea was based on
plaintiff's own tests; Camel cigarettes burn longer than other popular
brands and are, therefore, more economical. The plaintiff further ad-
vised the tobacco company, that they were at liberty to make a photostatic
copy of his letter for advertising purposes, provided that they would recom-
pense him for his idea and tests submitted. The defendant never answered
or photostated the letter. About five years later the defendant began an
advertising campaign based on the economy of longer burning Camels.
The plaintiff claimed that his idea had been used and that he should be
reimbursed, but the court held that there was no evidence of a contract
expressed in fact, and that there would be no contract imposed by law,
as the claimant's idea was not new, novel, or concrete.
C.
Cases Granting Protection.
The modern trend in this area seems to be in the direction of extending
protection for the value or property interest contained in commercial ideas,
provided they are reduced to a concrete form, are original and have never
been published so as to constitute an abandonment thereof to the public. 146
The leading decision on this point is Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co.,
v. Meyer,147 in which case the plaintiff submitted to the defendant an
original advertising scheme to be used on billboards. The idea consisted
of a picture of one man extending a package of cigarettes, and another
man declining, saying, "No thanks, I smoke Chesterfield." The proposal
was unsolicited and the plaintiff indicated that he expected remuneration if
the idea were used. The company never accepted the specific offer and
advanced no promise to pay, but sometime later adopted the scheme in its
advertising and then declined to make remuneration to the plaintiff. The
court, in affirming a verdict for plaintiff for $9000, held that the plaintiff
had a property right in the advertising scheme because the idea was new
and novel and had been reduced to a concrete form. It was further held
that such property rights were the proper subject for sale, and since
the defendants made a beneficial use of the property the law would raise an
obligation to pay therefor. Thus, relief in quasi-contract based on a
promise imposed by law was recognized in order to protect property rights
in ideas.
This decision has been followed in a number of subsequent cases
involving advertising. In Ryan & Associates v. Century Brewing
Ass'n,148 the plaintiff, pursuant to an invitation, submitted a slogan for
145. 350 Pa. 262, 38 A.2d 61 (1944).
146. Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F.Supp. 689 (D. D.C. 1952); aff'd., 210
F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
147. 101 Ind. App. 520, 194 N.E. 206 (1935).
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the promotion of a beer. The defendant accepted and used the slogan but
failed to give any compensation for the same, and the plaintiff sued and
was awarded a judgment for $7500 on the theory of an implied in law
contract.
The case of Bolt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 149 involved a claimant who
was in the advertising business and who created an idea for a radio
program featuring school children as local talents. The claimant was hired,
after submitting the idea, to do preparatory work on the program, but
after a short tenure was fired. Several months later the defendant hired
another advertising agency for the purpose of putting this show into
effect, and the plaintiff then sued for compensation for the use of his idea.
The court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff for $3300, and stated the
criteria for allowing protection for commercial ideas as follows:
"... it may be stated that the right of an originator of an idea to
recover from one who uses or infringes it seems to depend upon
whether or not the idea was novel, and reduced to concrete form prior
to its appropriation to defendant, and, where the idea was disclosed
by the originator to the appropriator, whether such disclosure took
place under circumstances indicating that compensation was expected
if the idea was used. Where these prerequisites exist, recovery may
be had upon a theory of contract implied in fact or in law."'150
Later in the opinion, referring to the obvious difficulty that the older
cases posed in the marketing of commercial ideas, the court stated:
"that if the owner of an idea were not permitted to make sufficient
disclosure to a prospective purchaser in order to apprise the latter
what is being offered to him, it would never be possible to sell an
idea. Such a property right would be valueless. 'If it were held
otherwise, the mere offer to sell would destroy the thing offered.' "151
When the decision in the case of Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v.
Meyer, 52 supra, was announced, it was felt that the extension of the rule
of that case, in which unsolicited ideas were protected, would open up a
Pandora's box of recoveries on spurious charges of plagiarism and
would place an undue burden on business firms that may have arrived at
similar schemes or ideas along independent lines of thought. 153 However,
few cases' 54 have followed Liggett & Meyer' 55 in allowing recovery for an
149. 108 F.Supp. 689 (D. D.C. 1952), aff'd, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
150. Id. at 691.
151. Id. at 692.
152. 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935).
153. Note, 44 YALn L.J. 1269 (1935).
154. Healey v. R. H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y. Supp. 165 (App. Div. 1937);
contra Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
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idea submitted without invitation. Most of the cases" subsequent to
Liggett & Meyer would seem to limit recovery to situations in which the
plaintiff's idea was solicited expressly or to situations where the plaintiff
was in the business of providing ideas, in which case the defendant would
be on notice as to the type of offers being made.
The exact limitations of the above developed doctrine of legal pro-
tection for commercial ideas is currently nebulous, but it at least seems
certain that the law now recognizes property rights in commercial ideas,
and if these ideas are sufficiently novel and concrete and are revealed
under circumstances indicating that compensation is expected if the idea
discussed is later used, an unauthorized use of such ideas will afford the




It has been attempted in the foregoing discussion to examine the
avenues of protection that are available to the advertiser. A comparison
of the protection from imitation existing under the doctrine of unfair
competition and that existing under the copyright laws should indicate the
value of copyright protection to the advertiser. Advertisements possessing
the least degree of artistic value and originality can be copyrighted, and if
published with the requisite notice and subsequently registered for a
nominal fee, 157 will be granted the full protection of the copyright laws
with all their advantages in regard to proof, damages, and forum.
One of the primary benefits which the statute confers is in regard
to the burden of proof demanded of the claimant. If the owner of the
advertisement has registered his copyright, the certificate of registration
is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright 5 , and places upon
the defendant the burden of introducing sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption of validity.
In the proof of infringement the plaintiff need not prove fraudulent
intent, (although showing of intent is still a requirement in establishing
unfair competition in many jurisdictions) it being sufficient to show the
resulting similarity between the advertisements. Further, the copyright
protection extends to cases of imitation by competitors and noncompetitors
alike, and on proof of infringement relief may be granted without proof of
any deception of the public or loss of good will or business on the part
of the advertiser.
As regards damages, if actual damages can be proven the recovery
can be as great as in the case of unfair competition. The statute also
provides that plaintiff need only prove the amount of sales by defendant,
156. Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
157. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 215 (1952).
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the burden of showing cost being on the latter, however, in the event such
proof is impossible, which will generally be the rule in advertising cases,
the copyright statute provides for specific damages in lieu of proof of
actual damages, thus assuring a monetary recovery in all cases. The
statute also expressly provides for the awarding of attorney's fees. There
are no such advantages existing under the doctrine of unfair competition.
In addition, if one has availed himself of copyright protection he
will in many cases have the advantage of the federal forum to process not
only his claim for infringement, but in addition, to determine his action
for recovery for unfair competition, even if there is no diversity. This
in effect allows him the choice of alternative forums, and reduces the cost
of litigation if he seeks recovery on both claims simultaneously. In any
event, if the advertiser has obtained a copyright he will have a claim for
infringement which will allow access to the federal courts if he is un-
successful with common law actions in the state courts.
Despite the ease with which a copyright can be obtained, the fact
remains, as even a cursory glance at any periodical would reveal, that
most advertisements are not copyrighted. This situation has been noted
by legal writers, 15 9 and they have advanced as explanations for the failure of
advertisers to obtain copyrights, the fact that advertisements are generally
meant to exist for a short duration and are seldom repeated, and also
that there is uncertainty in the advertising industry as to whether imitation
is a commercial harm or a beneficial form of flattery.
In response to this analysis it is submitted that there is little merit
to such arguments, and further, that when one considers the economy and
ease with which a copyright can be secured, any lawyer who fails to ac-
quire copyright protection for his client is doing that client a disservice.
It may well be the case that most advertisements will not be repeated, and
in most cases there will be no need for 28 years protection. However,
the advertiser can never predict in advance what particular format and
arrangement in his advertisements will be most effective in catching and
holding the public eye. It happens often enough that one particular adver-
tisement has extraordinary appeal, and the same advertisement, in sub-
stance, may be repeated several or several hundred times. Further, once
having secured the copyright, the advertiser can avail himself of the
protection from imitation or refrain from an exercise of his legal remedies
at his discretion, depending upon whether in the particular circumstances
he considers imitation harmful or merely flattering. In addition, he can
protect himself and his investment in the advertisement from imitation
by others who, absent such protection, may, at a later date without cost
to themselves, utilize the fruits of his effort and investment.
However, in all cases, whether the advertiser subsequently needs or
desires the protection, if he has not secured the copyright in advance of
159. Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35 Ky. L.J. 205 (1947); Freed!and,
Copyright Protection of Advertising, 27 Ky. L.J. 391 (1939).
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publication, he will be considered to have dedicated his subject matter
to the public and his protection under the copyright statute will be
forfeited.
Thus, it appears that there are compelling reasons for the procure-
ment of copyrights, and it is strongly urged that advertisers in the future
avail themselves of copyright protection to a much greater extent.
William B. Colsey III
LIENS-JUDGMENT LIENS IN PENNSYLVANIA-PRIORITY DATING
FROM RENDITION OR FROM INDEXING.
In Pennsylvania at the present time judgments are liens by virtue of
the Judgment Lien Law,1 while the lien of a verdict is the creation of an
act of 1877 and is exclusive to Pennsylvania.2 The effect of both liens is
to create a charge on the real property of the debtor located within the
county where the court rendering the judgment or verdict sits, 3 with the
exception of a term for years. 4 A judgment can be transferred, though,
so as to create a charge on land in another county by testatum writ of
fieri facias or by mere exemplification of the record 5 but a verdict cannot
be so transferred. 6 Another fact to be noted about such liens is that they
continue only for five years unless revived sooner. 7 Unlike the majority
of jurisdictions,8 in Pennsylvania judgment liens do not attach to after
acquired property, 9 but a revival of the judgment after the acquisition of
such property will subject it to a lien.10 It should be further noted that
the above statements apply to both judgments rendered by a court and
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 878 (1953).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 861, 862 (1953).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 878 (1953). The rule is the same for judgments of
the federal district courts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1932 (1930) and 62 STAT. 958
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1952).
4. Sheaffir v. Baeringer, 346 Pa. 32, 29 A.2d 697 (1943).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 891 (1953).
6. Bailey v. Eden, 90 Pa. 446 (1879).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 878, 879 (1953). Verdict liens also continue on!y
for five years, not by statute, but by analogy with judgment liens. Fuellhart v.
Thompson, 11 Pa. Super. 273 (1899), approved in Rosenheck v. Stape, 332 Pa. 287,
3 A.2d 678 (1939). Originally the judgment lien was of indefinite duration, btxt
the Act of April 4, 1798, 3 SMTI'Hs LAWS 331, § 2 limited it to five years.
8. E.g. Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916).
9. General Casmir Pulaski Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Provident Trust Co., 338 Pa.
198, 12 A.2d 336 (1940) ; Rundle & Murgatroyd v. Ettwein, 2 Yeates 23 (Pa. 1795).
See generally, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 246 (1949).
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those entered of record by a prothonotary pursuant to a cognovit note,"
and that decrees in equity ordering money to be paid also create liens.' 2
The aspect of the law of judgment and verdict liens to be dealt with
here is that of priority. The priority of a judgment or verdict lien is im-
portant since under the rule, "prior in time is prior in right," the value
and even the existence of a judgment lien depends upon its temporal
priority relative to conveyances and other liens affecting the judgment
debtor's real property. 13 In order to determine whether a particular lien
is prior to a conveyance or another lien in time, and therefore in right,
it is necessary to determine from what event the lien dates or has priority.
As to judgment liens this event has been determined by various juris-
dictions to be either the date or time of rendition,' 4 the date or time of
docketing or indexing'5 or the date or time of the issuance of execution.' 6
In Pennsylvania, as will be seen, it cannot be determined with certainty
whether the crucial event fixing the priority of the lien of an adverse
judgment or verdict is the time of rendition of the judgment or verdict
or the time of indexing thereof.
The problem is much the same with amicable judgments except that
the conflict exists between the time the judgment is left for record and the
time of indexing.
The purposes of this comment, therefore, are to point out the uncer-
tainties regarding judgment and verdict lien priorities under present
Pennsylvania legislation, and to provide, if possible, a guide to conduct
which will help avoid the dangers existing because of these uncertainties.
I.
STATUTES IN FORCE.
A. Act of 1772.
There are five acts still apparently in force which bear upon the
problem of the priority of judgment and verdict liens. The first of these
is the Act of 1772, Section 2 of which provides:
"Such judgments as against purchasers bona fide for valuable
consideration of lands ...to be charged thereby, shall, in considera-
11. Boyer's Estate, 51 Pa. 432 (1866) (dictum). The discussion hereinafter will
refer, in terms, chiefly to adverse judgments. However, it can be made applicable
to judgments entered without formal court action by substituting the phrase, "left for
entry," for the word "rendered," throughout this comment.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1225 (1953). The judgments or decrees of vir-
tually all the courts of Pennsylvania are or can become liens on the realty of thejudgment debtor. I LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA §§ 178-82 (2d ed.
1911). This includes judgments in the federal district courts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 1932 (1930), 62 STAT. 958 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1952).
13. Federal, state, and municipal tax liens will not be considered in this com-
ment.
14. E.g. Beloate v. New England Securities, 128 Ark. 215, 193 S.W. 795 (1917).
15. E.g. Sorrel v. Vance, 102 Ala. 207, 14 So. 738 (1894).
16. E.g. Graham v. Humm, 191 Ky. 28, 229 S.W. 80 (1921). In fact, under this
view there is no judgment lien in the sense used here but only an execution lien.
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tion of law be judgments only from such time as they shall be so
signed, and shall not relate to the first day of the term whereof they
are entered, . . . any law, usage or course of any court to the contrary
notwithstanding.'17
Under this statute, as against good faith purchasers' 8 for value, the lien
of a judgment dates from the signing thereof which is equivalent,
chronologically, to rendition. It should be noted that this act abolished
the doctrine of relation back to the first day of the term only as against
purchasers, and has no application by its terms to the lien of a mortgage
or another judgment lien' 9 or that of an attachment.2 0
B. Act of 1856.
The second act of significance to the question of judgment lien priori-
ties is the Act of 1856 which provides:
"The lien of no judgment, recognizance, execution levied on real
estate in the same or another county, or of writs of scire facias to
revive or have execution of judgment, shall commence or be continued
as against any purchaser or mortgagee, unless the same be indexed
in the county where the real estate is situated, in a book to be called
the judgment index; and it shall be the duty of the prothonotary or
the clerk forthwith to index the same according to priority of date
and the plaintiff shall furnish the proper information to enable him
to perform said duty."
'2 1
The first question to be considered is whether this act impliedly repeals
or modifies the Act of 1772. The 1772 act fixed the event for the com-
mencement of a lien as against good faith purchasers for value at rendition
or signing of the judgment. The Act of 1856 states that the lien of a
judgment shall not commence against purchasers and mortgagees unless
the judgment is indexed. It does not state that the lien shall not commence
until it is indexed. Therefore, it would be possible to construe the two
acts together as stating, in effect, that the lien of a judgment will not
prevail against subsequent mortgagees and purchasers unless it is indexed
but when indexed the lien relates back to the time of signing as against
purchasers, and to the first day of the term of court during which it was
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 863 (1953). Section 1 of this act, PA. STAr. ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 741, 742 requires judges and officers of the courts of record who signjudgments to set down the date of such signing.
18. In real property law the term purchaser includes anyone who takes realty
other than by descent.
19. Welsh v. Murray, 4 Dallas 320 (Pa. 1805).
20. Hooten v. Will, 1 Dallas 450 (Pa. 1789), decided subsequent to the enactment
of this statute, held that the lien of a judgment related back to the first day of the
term of court so as to be prior to the lien of domestic attachment which commenced
before the judgment was entered but after the first day of the term in which the
judgment was entered.
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entered as against mortgagees. As to other encumbrancers, under this
construction, the lien would have priority from the first day of the term
of court even without indexing. However, this was not the construction
given these acts by the courts. Instead, judgment priority even as between
judgments was determined by the date of entry.22 Apparently, after the
Act of 182723 imposed a duty on the prothonotaries to docket judgments
"in chronological order as of the time rendered, entered or filed" the
doctrine of relation back of the judgment lien to the first day of the term
of court was considered abolished as to all encumbrancers, as well as to
good faith purchasers for value. Also, the case of Paslawski v. Borgs24
holds that there is no doctrine of relation back to the time of rendition
upon indexing of the judgment as against purchasers and mortgagees
without actual notice. In the Paslawski case the judgment was entered
of record and indexed erroneously after which the judgment debtor con-
veyed to an innocent purchaser. After the conveyance there was a nunc
pro tune amendment of the docket and index and the judgment creditor
sought to enforce his lien against the purchaser. The court held that
such an amendment does not prejudice innocent persons who purchase
after entry of the judgment but before correct indexing. If the acts of 1772
and 1856 had been construed to create a lien which arose at indexing but
was retroactive to the time of rendition or entry it would have followed
that when the judgment was properly indexed the lien would have had
priority from the time of entry of the judgment and the innocent pur-
chaser would have lost. However, such a result would materially reduce
the value of the judgment index as an aid in searching for encumbrances.
In The York Bank's Appeal25 it was held that erroneous docketing by a
judgment creditor would not result in postponement of his lien to that
of a subsequent judgment creditor who had actual knowledge of the prior
judgment. This rule was applied to a subsequent purchaser with actual
notice in Lambert v. K-Y Transportation Co.26 Thus a notice theory was
adopted under which indexing of the judgment became necessary for
priority as to all except those with actual notice of the judgment.
C. Judgment Lien Law of 194727; Judgment Liens Versus Conveyances.
Section 2 of the Judgment Liens Law provides:
"Every judgment now or hereafter entered of record and indexed
in any court of record of this Commonwealth shall be a lien upon
all real property within the County where the judgment is entered
22. Glasgow v. Kann, 171 Pa. 262, 32 Atl. 1095 (1895). Of course, when the
doctrine of relation back to the first day of the term of court was applied judgments
entered during the same term prorated since their priority dated from the same time.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1903 (1930).
24. 138 Pa. Super. 288, 11 A.2d 199 (1940).
25. 36 Pa. 458 (1860).
26. 113 Pa. Super. 82, 172 Atl. 180 (1934).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 877-884 (1953).
[VOL. 5
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol5/iss4/4
SUMIMER 1960]
which at the time of entry and indexing is owned by the person
against whom the judgment is entered, and shall unless sooner dis-
charged as provided by law continue as a lien as to the defendant
and all other persons for a period of five years from the date on which
the judgment was entered, and no longer, 28 unless revived as herein-
after provided. '29
This act could be construed as abolishing the notice theory of prior law
since it states that judgments "entered of record and indexed" are liens.
Thus, it is arguable that a subsequent purchaser or lienor who becomes
such with actual notice of a prior judgment which has not yet been cor-
rectly indexed, would have priority over the prior judgment. This follows
from the fact that the prior judgment would not have been a lien until
indexed properly. Still, the courts will probably hold, as they have in the
past,3 0 that the purpose of the judgment docket and index is to give notice
and correct indexing is not necessary as to a person with actual notice. In
fact, Russeck v. Shapiro3 l contains dictum to this effect. Although that
case, which was decided after the enactment of the Judgment Lien Law,
held that a purchaser without actual notice of an incorrectly indexed
judgment took free of any lien, the court indicated that he would have
taken subject to the lien had he had actual knowledge of the rendition of
the judgment. Also, cases decided under the Act of 1856 have held that
a purchaser with actual knowledge takes subject to the lien of an incor-
rectly indexed judgment3 2 even though the terms of the act indicate clearly
that no lien will arise against a purchaser unless the judgment is cor-
rectly indexed. Therefore, even though the Judgment Lien Law further
indicates that no lien at all will arise without correct indexing, the deci-
sions under the act of 1856 would seem to indicate that under the Judgment
Lien Law the holdings will be the same, on the theory that the purpose
of indexing is to give notice, thus, when there is actual notice indexing is
not necessary.
Two other aspects of the problems regarding the priority of judgment
liens over conveyances need only brief mention. First, judgment creditors
are within the protection of the recording acts and an unrecorded deed will
not defeat the lien of a subsequent judgment.3 3 The other problem is
28. It should be noted that the last clause appears to abolish the doctrine that
a judgment lien lasts indefinitely as against the judgment debtor, his heirs and
devisees, with a presumption of payment after twenty years, and provides that as
against both the judgment debtor and a third party it must be revived every five years.
See McCahan v. Elliott. 103 Pa. 634 (1883).
29. PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 12, § 878 (1953).
30. E.g.. The York Bank's Appeal, 36 Pa. 453 (1860).
31. 170 Pa. Super. 89. 84 A.2d 514 (1951) (dictum).
32. E.g.. Lambert v. K-Y Transportation Co., 113 Pa. Super. 82, 172 Atil. 180
(1934).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 351 (1955), Miners' Savings Bank v. Tracy, 326
Pa. 357, 192 Atil. 246 (1937). However if the judgment creditor has other con-
structive notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance the conveyance has priority, and
such constructive notice will be found where the grantee is in exclusive possession.
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raised by the situation in which a judgment is rendered and the judgment
debtor makes a gift conveyance before indexing or before correct indexing.3 4
The Act of 1856 does not require indexing of the judgment as against
other than a purchaser or mortgagee, but the Judgment Lien Law appears
to require indexing for any lien to arise. However, the best answer would
seem to be that a donee takes subject to any unindexed or improperly
indexed judgment since the purpose of the requirement of indexing is to
provide a method whereby those who give value to the owner of realty
in reliance of his ownership thereof can protect themselves. There is
dictum to this effect in one case where the grantee was both a donee and
had actual notice.8 5
D. Lien Priority Law of 1951.36
In 1951 the Lien Priority Law was enacted, the second section of
which provides:
"Liens against real property shall have priority over each other
on the following basis:
(1) Purchase money mortgages, from the time they are delivered
to the mortgagee if they are recorded within thirty days after
their date; otherwise, from the time they are left for record.
(2) Other mortgages and defeasible deeds in the nature of
mortgages, from the time they are left for record.
(3) Verdicts for a specific sum of money, from the time they
are recorded by the court.
(4) Adverse judgments, orders and decrees, from the time they
are rendered.
(5) Amicable judgments, from the time the instruments on
which they are entered are left for entry.
(6) Writs which when issued and indexed by the prothonotary
create liens against real property, from the time they are
indexed.
(7) Other instruments which when entered or filed and indexed
in the prothonotary's office create liens against real prop-
erty, from the time they are left for entry or filing.
' 3 7
The first point which should be noted about the Lien Priority Law is
that it determines priorities of liens "over each other" and does not, there-
34. A non-fraudulent conveyance is assumed.
35. Meyer v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 230 Pa. 106, 79 Atd. 249 (1911). This
is the rule tinder the act requiring deeds of conveyance to be recorded. Kohn v.
Burke, 294 Pa. 282, 144 Atl. 75 (1928).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 601-603 (Supp. 1959).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 602 (Supp. 1959). The third section of the act,
§ 603, provides that the persons who record these various liens or render judgments
must endorse the time of leaving for record, rendition, or issuance, as the case may
be, on the instrument, judgment, or writ.
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fore, affect any contest between a lienor and a purchaser. Secondly, the
act changes the old view that judgments entered on the same day or a
judgment and a mortgage entered on the same day prorate on the theory
that a day is legally an indivisible unit of time.38 It has been implied that
the order in which the various liens are listed is significant, that is, since
mortgages are listed first they have priority over judgments which are
listed fourth, even if the mortgage was left for record long after the judg-
ment lien attached. 9 It seems, though, that the courts would require
explicit language in the statute before they would allow such a manifestly
unjust result. Thus, priority is determined by chronology and the Lien
Priority Law purports to fix the event by which the chronological position
of a particular lien, and, therefore, its priority is determined.
The fourth section of the Lien Priority Law40 expressly saves from
repeal both the Judgment Lien Law and the Act of 1856 and yet it fixes
the priority of an adverse judgment as dating from rendition and that
of an amicable judgment from the time it is left for entry.41 As stated
above, however, the Act of 1856 and the Judgment Lien Law of 1947
appear to require indexing of the judgment for a lien to be created, at
least as to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees and probably, under
the Judgment Lien Law, as to all subsequent lienors. Since the Lien
Priority Law expressly saves these acts from repeal a solution based on
an implied repeal is barred unless there is no way to construe the acts as
consistent with each other.42
II.
POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE ACTS.
Three ways of reconciling these apparent inconsistencies, without
finding an implied repeal, are available. The first would be to recognize that
under the Act of 1856 and the Judgment Lien Law a lien does not arise
until correct indexing, but that under the Lien Priority Law once the
judgment is correctly indexed the lien relates back to the time of rendi-
tion. The results under this construction would be equivalent to those
obtained by finding an implied repeal. The second resolution would con-
38. Metzler v. Kilgore, 3 Pen. & W. 245 (Pa. 1831) (two judgments) ; Clawson
v. Eichbaum, 2 Grant 115 (Pa. 1853) (judgment and mortgage). Actual priority
was always the test when a conveyance and a judgment lien were recorded on the
same day. Mechanics Bank v. Gorman, 8 W.&S. 304 (Pa. 1844).
39. See 13 U. PITT. L. REv. 148 (1951).
40. Act of June 28, Pa. Laws 1951, act 927, § 4.
41. The problems discussed herein exist both in the case of adverse judgments
and amicable judgments. In using the term "amicable judgment" the legislature was
probably referring to what is known as an amicable scire facias to revive a judg-
ment. See Second Nat'l Bank ex rel. Federal Reserve Bank v. Faber, 332 Pa.
124, 2 A.2d 747, 749 (1938). Whether or not cognovit notes are included in amicable
judgments is immaterial since if not they are clearly within the seventh category
in the Lien Priority Law which also designates leaving for entry as the crucial
event.
42. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together, if possible, even in the
absence of a saving clause, under the Statutory Construction Act. PA. STAT. ANN.
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sist of holding that under the Lien Priority Law a lien exists from the
time of rendition, but that under the Judgment Lien Law and the Act of
1856 it is subject to subordination if after rendition but before correct
indexing any lien of a person without actual notice of the judgment
attaches. Under this theory since the time of rendition would be signifi-
cant only when the subsequent lienor had actual notice, the provisions of
the Lien Priority Law would be almost totally vitiated. The third method of
reconciling the acts would require first, that the Judgment Lien Law be
eliminated from consideration on the theory that the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the subsequent enactment of the Lien Priority Law, was not
to direct the Judgment Lien Law at the question of priority of Judgment
liens, but rather at questions of acquisition, duration and revival of such
liens. Then, construing the Act of 1856 with the Lien Priority Law, the
result would be that, under the Lien Priority Law, the judgment lien
exists from the time of rendition, but, under the Act of 1856 it is subject
to subordination if, after rendition, but before correct indexing, the lien
of a mortgage attaches and the mortgagee was without actual notice of
the judgment. This third resolution seems to be the best since, although it
does modify the plain meaning of the terms of both the Judgment Lien
Law and the Lien Priority Law, it reaches reasonable results which could
have been intended by the legislature. The other two constructions reach
absurb results since the first amounts to an implied repeal of an act
expressly saved from repeal and the second is equivalent to a holding that
the saving clause repeals other sections in the same act.4"
The desirability of the results obtained under each of these solutions
would be best illustrated by applying them to a hypothetical fact situation.
A. Judgment Lien Versus Mortgage.
Suppose an adverse judgment is rendered in favor of C against D.
After rendition and signing of the judgment by the judge, but before it is
indexed correctly, M, who is without actual notice of the judgment, takes
a mortgage on the land for value from D. After M has left the mortgage
for record the judgment is indexed or an incorrect indexing is corrected.
The question of priority would arise when the land was sold at a sheriff's
sale and the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy in full both the debts
owed to C and M. Under the first resolution stated above, the lien of the
judgment would have priority from the time of rendition and would
therefore be prior to the lien of the mortgage. Under the second and third
resolutions the lien of the judgment would not hhve priority until indexed,
and therefore the mortgagee, M, would prevail over the judgment credi-
tor, C. It would seem that the result under either the second or third
resolution is the more desirable one since it permits greater reliance on the
judgment index and will result in greater certainty as to the state of a
real property title. Assuming that the courts would adopt this solution
43. Absurd results are not intended by the legislature, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,
§ 552 (1952).
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another problem arises which may be illustrated by changing one fact
in the above hypothetical situation-M, the mortgagee, has actual no-
tice. -As stated above44 it is arguable that the Judgment Lien Law
eliminated the rule that an unindexed or improperly indexed judgment
has priority over subsequent purchasers and mortgagees with actual no-
tice. Under that theory the mortgagee with notice would prevail since
as to mortgagees the lien does not arise until indexing. This would be an
undesirable and inconsistent result. The better resolution of the apparent
conflict between the several laws is that under which correct indexing
would be required as to purchasers and mortgagees. To state that there
is no lien until indexing but that it then relates back to the time of rendition
creates serious conceptual difficulties. A more logical synthesis would be
a theory of existence of the lien from rendition which lien may be sub-
ordinated to a subsequent mortgage of a mortgagee without actual or con-
structive notice. Under this rule the mortgagee with actual notice would
not prevail.
Before turning to the question of priority of judgment liens over
encumbrances other than those based on mortgages, including other judg-
ment liens, one thing should be noted. The Lien Priority Law clearly
controls the event which determines priority of all liens other than those
based on judgments. This is because there are no prior contrary acts
governing their priority which were expressly saved from repeal.
B. The Priority of Judgment Liens Over Other Liens.
The hypothetical fact situation that will be stated involves the lien of
a judgment and the lien of a verdict. However, all discussion regarding
this set of facts can be made equally applicable to other liens by substitu-
tion of the proper terms. Before stating the situation, though, the event
from which the priority of a verdict lien is determined must be ascertained.
The Act of 1877 creating that lien provides:
"Whenever a verdict is rendered by a jury in any of the courts
of common pleas of this commonwealth for any specific sum of money
in such case the verdict shall be a lien upon the real estate situate
within the proper county of the party or parties against whom said
verdict shall be rendered, which lien shall remain unless the court
grant a new trial or arrest the judgment; and it shall by the duty
of the prothonotary of the court of common pleas to enter such ver-
dict on the lien docket where judgments are entered, marking the
same 'verdict,' and specifying the amount of said verdict and the
date of its rendition." 45
The second section of the act provides:
"In the case the court shall overrule any motion for a new trial
or in arrest of judgment now pending, the lien of the verdict in such
44. See text following footnote 28, supra.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 861 (1953).
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shall date from the time of its rendition: Provided however, that no
innocent purchasers without notice shall be prejudiced thereby. '4
The lien Priority Act provides that verdicts are liens from the time they
are rendered, and this in no way conflicts with the terms of the Act of
1877. Therefore, on the face of the statutes a verdict which was rendered
but not indexed,, or at least not indexed correctly, before conveyance or
mortgage or the attachment of another lien would be prior in time and,
therefore, in right. The argument could be made that since docketing of
the verdict is required the legislature intended that there be notice, actual
or constructive, before the lien of a verdict would prevail over that of
subsequent purchasers or lienors. The principal objection to this argument
is that it is equally applicable to all liens governed by the Lien Priority
Law and if applied consistently would render that law ineffective. A second
argument, applicable only to verdict liens, which might be made is that a
verdict lien by analogy to judgment liens is subject to the same limitations
to which a judgment lien is subject under the Judgment Lien Law and
the Act of 1856. Such a holding already has been made regarding the
duration of verdict liens.47 Under that analysis the lien of a verdict
would have priority from the same event as the lien of an adverse judgment,
which, as we have seen, could be either rendition, or indexing, depending
upon what type of lien the contest was with. However, it is likely that
both of these arguments would fail in the face of contrary statutory lan-
guage. It will, therefore, be assumed in discussing the hypothetical facts
posed that the priority of a verdict lien dates from rendition thereof.
After rendition of a judgment in favor of C against D, but before
correct indexing thereof, a verdict for a specific sum of money is rendered
against D in favor of V who had no notice of the prior judgment. D owns
real property in the county.
Under the first method of construing the Lien Property Law with
the Act of 1856 and the Judgment Lien Law, the judgment would become
a lien upon indexing but would relate back to rendition. Therefore, the
verdict lien would be junior to the lien of the judgment. Under the second
theory by which the various acts were construed together, the lien of the
judgment would date from rendition, but would be divested by the inter-
vention of a lien before correct indexing, if the lienor was without actual
notice. Under the third theory the lien of the judgment would date from
rendition and could be divested under the Lien Priority Law only by a
mortgagee without actual notice, and, therefore the judgment lien would
be prior. If V, the verdict lienor, had notice of the judgment at the time
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 862 (1953). Although this section still appears
in Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated as current, the words "now pending"
indicate that it was intended to govern cases in which a motion was pending at the
time the act was passed. The section, therefore, may now be obsolete.
47. Fuellhart v. Thompson, 11 Pa. Super. 273 (1899). This of course was a
case in which there was no statute, not to mention a contrary statute.
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the verdict was rendered only the result under the second theory would
be changed. Under the first theory the judgment would date from rendi-
tion regardless of notice. Under the third the lien of the judgment can
only be divested by a mortgage lien. Under the second theory the attach-
ment of any lien after rendition but before proper indexing postpones the
judgment lien unless the subsequent lienor had actual notice. The best
results seem to be reached under the first and third theories and the better
theory for reaching those results appears to be the third. Finding the
verdict lien junior regardless of actual or constructive notice is best be-
cause the verdict lienor does not rely upon indexing since knowledge of
a prior indexed judgment would not deter him from bringing the action
in that the lien of a verdict is incidental to the finding of liability which is
the main purpose for which the verdict is sought. It is better to reach this
result, that the verdict is junior if rendered after an unindexed or im-
properly indexed judgment, by the third theory since that theory can be
applied consistently to reach the opposite result When, instead of the lien
of a verdict, the lien in question is the lien of mortgage. A mortgagee
should be protected from indexing deficiencies since his is a consensual lien
and in the usual situation he is giving new value for his lien and is giving
that value largely in reliance on the judgment index.48
III.
POSSIBLE METHODS OF PROTECTING PURCHASERS AND MORTGAGEES.
Finally, the question of whether purchasers and mortgagees or their
insurers can protect themselves from these uncertainties in the law must
be faced. If rendition of the judgment or verdict is held to be the time
from which the lien thereof has priority regardless of whether there has
or has not been correct indexing, the Judgment Lien Law and the Act
of 1856 to the contrary nothwithstanding, or if there is held to be unlimited
relation back to rendition upon correct indexing there would be no method
of protection. On the other hand if the courts hold that correct indexing
is the event from which priority dates the index is complete protection
for purchasers and mortgagees. A possible distinction, not heretofore
mentioned, might be drawn by the courts between the normally short delay
between rendition and indexing and abnormal delays caused by erroneous
indexing. If this distinction were drawn the courts could hold that the
48. While it is not properly within the scope of this comment the Lien Priority
Law has also created uncertainty regarding mechanics' liens. Before the Lien Property
Law was enacted a mechanics' lien had priority from the time of visible commence-
ment of the work on the property, if filed timely. Knoell v. Canby, 291 Pa. 531,
140 Atl. 522 (1928). Now at least one authority believes it is possible that me-
chanics' liens are included in the seventh category of liens listed in that act. 1 LADNER,
CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 184 (Supp. 1941-1956). If so their priority
would date only from the time of leaving for entry, not from commencement of the
work. However, that category refers to "instruments which when entered or filed
in the prothonotary's office create liens against real property." Therefore, since
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risk of erroneous indexing is borne by the judgment creditor, but that a
purchaser or mortgagee bears the risk that he is becoming such during
the normally short interval between rendition and indexing. This possible
distinction was not mentioned previously because neither the terms of the
statutes involved nor the cases provide a factual basis for the distinction.
If it were made despite this obstacle, then purchasers and mortgagees could
reduce substantially the risk of taking subject to an unknown judgment
lien by having the purchaser or mortgagee pay an escrow and then record
his deed or mortgage. The escrow could hold the money for a period
deemed sufficient to allow any judgments rendered or left for record before
the deed or mortgage was recorded to be indexed. It at the end of that
period-three days would be more than safe-nothing previously ren-
dered was indexed, the escrow would be obligated to pay the money over
to the grantor or mortgagor. This precaution is recommended since,
though it might be futile, it permits the purchaser or mortgagee to argue
that he did all that was possible to protect himself and he should, there-
fore, be protected since the legislature could not have intended that he be
without a means of protecting himself. This is inferrable from the fact




The inconsistencies in the above statutes are a direct result of patch-
work legislation. The statutes in force relevant to the priority of judg-
ment liens have been enacted over a period of almost two hundred years;
in such a situation inconsistencies are inevitable. What is needed, therefore,
is a comprehensive legislative statement of the law of judgment lien priority.
It could provide that the lien of a judgment or a verdict shall attach and
have priority from the time it is rendered except that, as to subsequent
bona fide purchasers and subsequent bona fide mortgagees for value and
without constructive or actual notice of any prior lien or conveyance, the
judgment lien will be divested unless before such conveyance or mortgage
there is correct indexing of the judgment or verdict lien in the judgment
index. Such an act would clarify the priority of judgment liens, and would
also eliminate many circuity of lien problems, since if a purchaser or mort-
gagee had actual or constructive notice of any prior lien or conveyance
they would be subordinated to all prior liens or conveyances.
Needless to say, until such legislation is enacted or until there has
been an authoritative construction of the Lien Priority Law as it affects
priority of judgment liens, purchasers, and especially mortgagees and their
insurers should act as if a judgment is a lien from rendition whether in-
dexed correctly or not.
Leslie J. Carson, Jr.
[VOL. 5
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